The stark reality of cross-border jihadist violence carved another grim chapter into Northern Nigeria’s landscape on July 3–4, 2025. In two brutally efficient attacks separated by over 1,000 kilometers but united by ideology, jihadist groups slaughtered 28 civilians, torched homes and hospitals, and laid bare the terrifying fragility of regional security. Near Lake Chad, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters stormed the town of Malam Fatori, targeting a camp for those already displaced by conflict, killing 11 people and burning a critical hospital. Simultaneously, in Sokoto State, the jihadist faction known as Lakurawa—an operational arm of Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)—raided Kwallajiya village, massacring 17 residents in retaliation for local vigilantes killing three of their fighters days earlier. These weren’t random acts of barbarism. They were calculated strikes exploiting porous borders, fractured military alliances, and communities abandoned by the state.
Anatomy of the Attacks: Tactics, Targets, and Territories
The assault began at 1:20 AM GMT on July 3rd. ISWAP fighters, arriving in machine-gun-mounted vehicles, breached the defenses of Malam Fatori—a strategic town on Nigeria’s border with Niger. Their primary target? A camp sheltering thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) already fleeing years of violence. The jihadists opened fire indiscriminately, killing 11 people and wounding 20 others who were later evacuated across the border to Bosso hospital in Niger. They systematically torched government buildings, including the town’s only hospital—a critical lifeline—before retreating towards Lake Chad’s labyrinthine islands. This wasn’t just brutality; it was symbolism. Malam Fatori was clawed back from Boko Haram in 2015 as a symbol of state resilience. For ISWAP, seizing it—even temporarily—is a propaganda coup showcasing their resurgent power in the Lake Chad Basin.
A world away in Sokoto, the horror unfolded in broad daylight. Lakurawa militants invaded Kwallajiya village on July 2nd as residents prepared for afternoon prayers. Their motive was unequivocal: revenge. Days earlier, local vigilantes had repelled a Lakurawa raid, killing three jihadists—including a commander. The response was swift and savage. Fighters shot villagers working on their farms, burned homes, destroyed vital telecommunications masts, and laid waste to farmlands—a deliberate act of economic warfare to starve and isolate the community. Residents confirmed the attackers’ chilling warning: defy us, and face annihilation. This attack typifies Lakurawa’s modus operandi—extortion through terror, masked by a veneer of religious governance.
The Actors: Evolution and Expansion of Cross-Border Jihadism
| Group | Affiliation | Origins & Expansion | Core Tactics | Territorial Ambition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISWAP | Islamic State | Boko Haram splinter (2016). Resurgent in 2025 with ISIS support. | Base overruns, armed drones, IEDs, night raids. | Lake Chad Basin, NE Nigeria. |
| Lakurawa/ISSP | Islamic State | ISSP cell from Mali-Niger border (2018). Infiltrated NW Nigeria 2024. | Village raids, livestock rustling, taxation, sharia enforcement. | Sokoto-Kebbi corridor (Nigeria), Dosso (Niger). |
| JNIM | Al-Qaeda | Merger of Sahelian groups (2017). Expanding southwards. | Siege warfare, community embedding, proselytization. | Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands. |
Dismissing ISWAP as “on its last legs” is dangerously naive. The group is executing its most aggressive offensive since 2018–2019, overrunning 15 Nigerian military bases since January 2025 alone—including the strategic Marte and Dikwa bases in May. Their tactics have evolved alarmingly: Armed drones once used only for reconnaissance are now rigged with explosives for precision strikes—a technique honed with ISIS core support. Propaganda videos in late 2024 even showed ISIS advisors in Lake Chad training fighters. Bridge sabotage destroys key infrastructure like those near Damboa to isolate targets and hinder military reinforcements. Night raids enhanced by potential night-vision equipment allow attacks during historically safer hours. This resurgence is fueled by direct logistical and tactical support from the Islamic State core, suggesting a coordinated effort to reignite the Caliphate’s most potent African franchise.
Mislabeled as “new,” Lakurawa is the local face of Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Its roots trace back to 2018, when ISSP cells began operating in Niger’s border forests. By 2024, exploiting the diplomatic rupture between Nigeria and Niger after Niger’s 2023 coup, they entrenched themselves in Sokoto’s Tsauni Forest—a corridor stretching into Niger. Their strategy is insidious: Co-optation saw them initially invited by Sokoto communities (2016-2017) to fight bandits, where they were paid as protectors. Once entrenched, they imposed zakat (taxes) on cattle and harvests, and demanded allegiance to their harsh sharia law. Recruitment involves offering seed money (up to 1 million Naira) and farming tools to impoverished youth. Village massacres, like Kwallajiya, punish resistance and deter cooperation with the state. Their violence is not mindless; it’s a governance model built on fear and exploitation, mirroring ISSP’s playbook in Burkina Faso.
While not involved in these specific attacks, JNIM’s encroachment into Benin’s Alibori Department and Niger’s Tahoua creates a volatile multipolar conflict zone. JNIM focuses on embedding within communities via proselytization and mediating local disputes—contrasting sharply with ISSP’s extractive violence. Their seizure of Djibo town in Burkina Faso for several hours in May 2025 demonstrates their capacity to mass forces and strike urban centers. This expansion risks a collision with ISSP cells in Nigeria’s northwest, turning the region into a battleground for competing jihadist visions.
The Enabling Environment: Why Cross-Border Violence Thrives
| Security Gap | Current Status | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| MNJTF Coordination | Crippled by Niger’s withdrawal (March 2025) | Fractured intelligence sharing, reduced patrols |
| Nigeria’s “Supercamp” Strategy | Consolidation into fortified hubs | Rural areas abandoned, bases vulnerable to attacks |
| Bandit-Jihadi Nexus | Opportunistic coexistence | Weapons training, shared territories, grievance exploitation |
| Regional Geopolitics | Junta instability in Niger/Burkina Faso | Distracted militaries, Russian/Iranian involvement |
Regional counterterrorism is sabotaged by internal chaos: Niger’s junta accuses Nigeria and France of sponsoring Lakurawa to destabilize it, straining critical intelligence channels. Burkina Faso’s junta, reeling from JNIM sieges and a May 2025 coup attempt, courts Russian and Iranian support for regime survival—diverting resources from frontline counter-jihadism. Lake Chad Basin breakdown sees ISWAP tightening control over Marte LGA (300+ villages) and the Alagarno Forest as regional militaries focus on internal politics. Nigeria’s “supercamp” failure saw the army consolidate into fortified hubs (e.g., New Marte), abandoning rural areas to jihadists. These underfunded bases became targets—ISWAP looted 45 vehicles from one in May 2025 alone.
Northwest Nigeria’s estimated 30,000+ bandits dominate the local violence economy. While ideological convergence with jihadists is rare, opportunistic collaboration occurs: Weapons training sees jihadists offer tactics expertise to bandits. Tacit coexistence allows bandits like warlord Dogo Gide to operate in territories “taxed” by ISSP, avoiding direct confrontation. Grievance exploitation in Nigeria’s Middle Belt sees jihadists recruiting from communities displaced by climate-driven farmer-herder clashes, framing their struggle as divine retribution.
The Human Toll: Communities on the Frontlines
Over 2 million Nigerians are displaced by jihadist violence since 2009; 40,000+ are dead. In Sokoto and Kebbi, farm burnings destroy livelihoods, forcing farmers into “tax” pacts with Lakurawa for survival. Camps like Malam Fatori’s—intended as sanctuaries—become hunting grounds for jihadists. Destroyed hospitals leave wounds festering and diseases spreading unchecked. UN agencies warn 33 million face “acute food insecurity” in 2025—jihadist raids on farming communities are a primary driver.
Beyond statistics lie stories like Ibrahim Aliyu’s in Sokoto. On December 25, 2024, a Nigerian air force jet targeting Lakurawa hideouts dropped bombs on his village. His wife Mantu and five children burned to death in their hut. The military claimed secondary explosions from terrorist munitions caused civilian deaths—a pattern seen in at least 18 similar incidents killing over 400 Nigerians since 2021. Ibrahim returned from working as a camel porter to find his family reduced to charred remains beside their millet sacks. These “accidental” strikes epitomize the brutal calculus of counterinsurgency: communities caught between jihadist extortion and state violence that often proves indiscriminate.
Pathways to Containment: Closing the Gaps
Reinforce the MNJTF by compensating for Niger’s exit with AU/UN-backed drone surveillance and standardized intelligence protocols, funded by the EU Sahel Facility. Reform vigilantes by training and integrating vetted yan sa kai (self-defense militias) into formal security structures to deny jihadists retaliation pretexts. Invest in cross-border development corridors along the Sokoto-Niger and Benin-Niger borders with roads, clinics, and schools. Replicate successes like Park W’s eco-jobs initiative (Niger/Benin/Burkina Faso), which reduced jihadist recruitment by providing alternative livelihoods. Offer bandit amnesty programs providing non-ideological bandits pathways to demobilization (e.g., Zamfara’s gold mining tax reform), isolating jihadists from potential allies. Launch a counter-propaganda offensive debunking jihadist narratives via Hausa and Fulfulde radio dramas featuring defectors exposing ISSP’s brutality against Muslims.
The Borderless Battlefield
The bloodshed in Malam Fatori and Sokoto is not an aberration—it’s the inevitable outcome of a regional security ecosystem in collapse. As ISWAP leverages Lake Chad’s islands and ISSP entrenches along the Niger-Nigeria frontier, national borders are becoming mere lines on a map, weaponized by jihadists to evade accountability. The Nigerian government’s dismissal of these groups as “on their last legs” is not just inaccurate; it’s a dangerous delusion. Victory demands more than military surges—it requires rebuilding trust with communities abandoned by the state and exploited by extremists. Without coordinated cross-border governance, investment, and a relentless focus on human security, the Sahel’s borderlands risk becoming the definitive epicenter of global jihadist violence in our decade.
Cross-border jihadist attacks in the Niger-Nigeria-Benin triangle have doubled since 2023, with fatalities increasing by 120%.
Jihadization of Banditry – A process seen in Burkina Faso where criminals adopt jihadist rhetoric for legitimacy. In Nigeria, this remains limited due to bandits’ fractious power structures.
